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RESTORING THE BALANCE BETWEEN 
IMMIGRATION SELF-REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS AND THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 
SHEENA KELLEY† 
INTRODUCTION1 
 The small boat raced the rising sun, straining to reach shore 
before losing the veil of the morning haze.  The tension on board 
was as palpable as the muggy August air.  Thirty-five people sat 
packed together on the floor of the boat, unable to move and too 
afraid to try.  They watched the two men piloting the boat and 
anxiously awaited their signal.  Finally, they were told to get 
ready.  The boat jerked forward as it hit ground.2  Cursing, the 
captain ordered them off the boat.  They scurried over the side of 
the boat and ran ashore to conceal themselves in the bushes and 
await the next leg of their journey.  As soon as the last passenger 
cleared the side, the boat sped away. 
 
 
† Senior Staff Member, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s University 
School of Law; B.A., 2003, State University of New York College at Brockport.  Many 
thanks to my husband, Eric, for being my sounding board and constant source of 
support and inspiration. I would also like to express my gratitute to the Hon. 
Michael Telesca for his advice, encouragement and overall mentorship.      
1 The following narration is based loosely on the facts of United States v. Garcia-
Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547. 
2 Disregard for human life and acts of violence are not uncommon in the 
business of alien smuggling. See, e.g., Alien Smuggling, U.S. IMMIGR. SUPPORT, 
http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/alien-smuggling.html (last visited Sept. 16, 
2012). All too often, aliens are injured or killed as a result of dangerous conditions 
during the journey or in an attempt to evade authorities. See, e.g., id.; Brian W. 
Robinson, Smuggled Masses: The Need for a Maritime Alien Smuggling Law 
Enforcement Act, ARMY LAW. at 20, 20–21, Aug. 2010, available at 
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/08-2010.pdf; Amanda Lee Myers, ‘Major’ 
Human Smuggling Cell Busted in Arizona, USATODAY.COM (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/states/arizona/2010-11-10-2156779578_x.htm. 
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The journey had reached its end.  Coast Guard Officers 
patrolling the area heard a boat run aground and arrived in time 
to see several people jump from the boat and run ashore.  The 
officers searched the bushes and found thirty-five people whom 
they determined to be Cuban nationals.  None of the Cuban 
nationals had immigration documents authorizing them to enter 
the United States.  The boat and its two-man crew were also 
apprehended nearby.  Officers found a satellite phone and a GPS 
on board.  These devices revealed that the boat had left Pinar del 
Rio, Cuba on August 12, 2008 and traveled to Loggerhead Key, 
Florida, where it was apprehended on August 13, 2008.  
Loggerhead Key is not a designated port of entry.3 
The two men who piloted the boat were charged with 
conspiracy, thirty-five counts of encouraging and inducing  
aliens to enter the United States in violation of 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A)(iv), and attempting to reenter the United 
States after removal.4  These men were also charged with thirty-
five counts of bringing unauthorized aliens to the United States 
and failing to immediately bring and present them to an 
immigration officer for inspection.5  Not only did these men 
violate U.S. law by bringing undocumented Cuban nationals into 
the United States, they broke the law by not reporting their own 
illicit activities immediately to the government. 
To facilitate information gathering, the government has 
increasingly relied upon statutes that create an affirmative duty 
for individuals to report information to the government.6  These 
statutes allow the government to operate effectively in areas 
such as immigration law, where it would be inefficient, and likely 
impossible, to obtain this information through independent 
means.7  However, the government’s legitimate interest in 
enforcing these reporting provisions often is in tension with 
individuals’ Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled 
self-incrimination.8  The Supreme Court has been called on to 
 
3 Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1313–14.  
4 Id. at 1313.  
5 Id. 
6 Jeremy H. Temkin, “Hollow Ritual[s]”: The Fifth Amendment and Self-
Reporting Schemes, 34 UCLA L. REV. 467, 467–68 (1986).  
7 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 455 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1971) (noting 
that self-reporting requirements are essential to the government’s ability to collect 
income taxes). 
8 Temkin, supra note 6, at 468. 
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examine several of these reporting provisions and has recognized 
the need to balance the competing interests of the government 
and of private individuals.9 
In the field of immigration, self-reporting statutes are used 
to facilitate the screening and tracking of applicants seeking 
admission to the United States.10  Violations of these statutes 
traditionally result in civil consequences, such as exclusion or 
deportation.11  However, federal immigration law is becoming 
increasingly more criminalized12 and, as a result, self-reporting 
requirements now appear in felony provisions of immigration 
law.13  Notable among these is 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii),14 
which is a self-reporting provision that requires anyone bringing 
undocumented aliens to the United States to immediately bring 
those aliens to a designated port of entry15 and present them to 
an immigration officer for inspection.16  This is referred to as the 
“bring and present” requirement.17 
The tension between government need and Fifth 
Amendment privilege created by the “bring and present” 
requirement is evident.18  However, the Supreme Court has held 
that not all self-reporting statutes are unconstitutional—the 
privilege against self incrimination “may not be invoked to resist 
 
9 Id.  
10 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (requiring applicants for 
admission to the United States to answer questions under oath regarding their 
intentions); 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006).  
11 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (providing for the removal of applicants for 
admission that are deemed inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2006) (making failure 
to notify the Attorney General of a change in address a misdemeanor and providing 
that the alien shall be removed regardless of whether the offense is prosecuted 
criminally); 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2006) (prescribing civil penalties for failure to depart 
when so ordered). 
12 See generally Gia E. Barboza, From the Legal Literature, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 
511 (2009). 
13 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) (making it a felony to not bring 
and present an alien to an immigration officer upon arrival). 
14 Id.  
15 A port of entry is a location, designated by statute, staffed by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection personnel and used for processing individuals, agricultural 
products, and merchandise being imported into the United States. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 100.4(a) (2009); Ports of Entry and User Fee Airports, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_outreach/ports.xml (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2012). 
16 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
17 United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 615 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547. 
18 Temkin, supra note 6, at 468. 
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compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the 
State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its 
criminal laws.”19 
To determine which reporting requirements fall within this 
regulatory regime exception, the Supreme Court established a 
three-factor test in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board.20  This test requires courts to evaluate whether the 
reporting requirement (1) is aimed at a highly selective group 
inherently suspect of criminal activity, (2) is asserted in an 
essentially regulatory area of inquiry, and (3) creates a 
substantial likelihood of prosecution.21  While this test was 
adequate when established, its continued application has led to 
the inequitable denial of rights due to the increasingly criminal 
nature of areas of law that were traditionally regulatory, such as 
immigration law.22  The need to balance regulatory reporting 
provisions, such as the “bring and present” requirement, and the 
privilege against compelled incrimination has been a tenuous 
one—more so in light of the increasing criminalization of 
regulatory law.23 
This Note argues that the test currently relied on to 
maintain this balance is no longer effective and must be replaced.  
Part I analyzes the history of immigration law and limitations on 
Fifth Amendment protections.24  Part I also examines the 
legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) and its intended 
use as an anti-smuggling statute.25  Part II discusses the factors 
used by courts to evaluate Fifth Amendment claims and courts’ 
treatment of various reporting provisions.26  This Part also 
discusses how these factors, as they are currently applied by the 
courts, no longer adequately protect individuals’ Fifth 
Amendment rights.27  Part III illustrates the inadequacies in the 
current application of these factors by applying them to the 
 
19 Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990). 
20 See generally Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 
(1965) (laying out the three-factor test for determining which reporting 
requirements fall within the exception). 
21 See United States v. Adair, No. 88-1264, 1988 WL 114791 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 
1988). 
22 Infra, Part II. 
23 Infra, Part I. 
24 Infra, Part I. 
25 Infra, Part I. 
26 Infra, Part II. 
27 Infra, Part II. 
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“bring and present” requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii).28  
Part IV suggests that the factors evaluated by courts must be 
fundamentally altered to guarantee the continued protection of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from compelled self-
incrimination.29  This Part suggests that a more effective test 
would restrict the evaluation of the nature of inquiry to the 
statute itself and would require courts to conduct a more 
structured evaluation of the group targeted by the statute.30 
I. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Evolution of Immigration Law 
Immigration law was traditionally a means of regulating the 
entry and naturalization process of aliens.  In the beginning, the 
only intersect between criminal law and immigration law was in 
the denial of entry to those with an existing criminal record.31  
However, through the enactment of successive legislation, the 
two areas of law have become hopelessly intertwined.  This 
merger between immigration law and criminal law has occurred 
in three general ways: (1) through the proliferation of criminal 
laws in the area of immigration, (2) harsher sentences for 
immigration violations, and (3) changes in immigration 
enforcement practices.  The substantial changes in these three 
areas have resulted in immigration law that is irreparably 
intertwined with criminal law. 
1.  The Proliferation of Criminal Offenses in Immigration Laws 
The United States did very little to regulate immigration 
through most of the 19th century.32  Initially, aliens were only 
deportable if, within a year of arrival, they became a public 
charge.33  The grounds for deportation were expanded in 1917 to 
include any alien who, within five years of arrival, had been 
 
28 Infra, Part III. 
29 Infra, Part IV. 
30 Infra, Part IV. 
31 See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 381 (2006). 
32 See Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration 
Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1924–1965, 21 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 69, 73 (2003); Stumpf, supra note 31 (noting that originally only those with 
prior criminal histories were denied entry). 
33 See Ngai, supra note 32, at 74. 
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convicted of a felony, a crime involving moral turpitude,34 or 
prostitution.35  The first steps towards the criminalization of 
immigration law began in the 1920s with the enactment of 
legislation that set an annual cap on the number of aliens who 
would be allowed to immigrate legally.36  This legislation created 
a divide between those aliens who were in the U.S. lawfully and 
those who entered illegally and greatly increased the need for 
deportation proceedings.37  Shortly thereafter, Congress made it a 
crime for aliens to unlawfully enter the country.38 
Since first criminalizing illegal entry, there has been a 
steady increase in both the number of criminal offenses and the 
scope of offenses covered under immigration law.  Congress 
passed several immigration initiatives in the late 1980s39 and the 
1990s40 that allowed for deportation of aliens for an expanded list 
 
34 “Moral turpitude” is a vague phrase which, despite over 100 years of judicial 
application, has managed to evade any precise judicial or statutory definition. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Holder, 413 F. App’x 435, 437 (3d Cir. 2010) (defining moral 
turpitude as conduct which is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the 
accepted rules of morality”), vacated in part as moot, No. 09-3478, 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 2593 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2011); United States v. Biggs, 157 F. 264, 269 (D. Colo. 
1907), aff’d, 211 U.S. 507 (1909) (defining crimes involving moral turpitude as acts 
which evince a “base, corrupt, and malevolent purpose”). In evaluating whether a 
crime is one of moral turpitude, courts look at the “inherent nature of the offense” 
rather than at the individual’s conduct. Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 
1284 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vuksanovic v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 439 F.3d 1308, 1311 
(11th Cir. 2006)). Some crimes generally considered to be crimes of moral turpitude 
are homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, arson, embezzlement, bribery, larceny, 
various sex offenses, counterfeiting, and tax evasion. What Constitutes “Crime 
Involving Moral Turpitude” Within Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar 
Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of 
Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480, §§ 10(a)–(c), 11(a), (c)–(d), (g), 12(b)–(j), 13(a)–(b) 
(2011). 
35 H.R. 10384, 64th Cong. § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (1917). 
36 See Ngai, supra note 32, at 76 (“The 1929 law made illegal entry a separate 
criminal offense . . . . [C]onviction also made future reentry impossible.”). The 
passage of these regulations coincided with the “Red Scare,” the end of World War I, 
and other anti-immigrant hostilities of the 1920’s. Id. at 74–76. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 76. An alien’s first unlawful entry was punishable as a misdemeanor by 
up to one year in jail; any subsequent unlawful re-entry was a felony offense 
punishable by two years. Id. Conviction of these offenses also made the alien 
inadmissible for subsequent legal entry. Id. 
39 See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 101, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)). 
40 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 602, 104 Stat. 4978, 
5077–81 (1990); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–78 (1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and 
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of aggravated felonies as well as drug offenses and created 
criminal offenses for hiring illegal immigrants, marriage fraud, 
entrepreneurship fraud, attempted improper entry, and falsely 
claiming United States citizenship.41  Many of these statutes 
have been applied retroactively, exposing lawful permanent 
residents to deportation for crimes that may not have been 
considered aggravated felonies at the time they were 
committed.42  In 1986, under the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”) and the Immigration Marriage 
Fraud Amendments of 1986 (“IMFA”), felony offenses were 
created for marriage fraud43 and immigration-related 
entrepreneurship fraud.44  These offenses, applicable to both 
aliens and U.S. citizens, carry sentences of up to five years.45  In 
1996, Congress created several new criminal provisions to be 
included in immigration law,46 including a felony offense for high-
speed flight from an immigration checkpoint.47  The body of U.S. 
immigration law that was once entirely civil now includes over 
twenty-five sections that expressly define criminal conduct or 
 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101, 110 Stat. 3009-
546, 3009-553 to 54 (1996). 
41 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 321 
(lowering required sentence for violent crimes to one year and adding rape and 
sexual abuse of minor to definition of aggravated felony); Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act §§ 440(e)(1), (3), (4) (adding gambling, alien smuggling, 
and passport fraud to definition of aggravated felony); Immigration Act of 1990 
§§ 121, 501(a)(3), (6) (criminalizing attempted unlawful entry and entrepreneurship 
fraud and adding laundering, crimes of violence punishable by term of at least five 
years, and certain foreign convictions to definition of aggravated felony); 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101 (criminalizing knowingly 
employing an alien who is unauthorized to work); Immigration Marriage Fraud 
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2, 100 Stat. 3537, 3537–38 (1986) 
(criminalizing marriage fraud); see also Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries 
Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 81, 84–85 (2005) [hereinafter Miller, Blurring the Boundaries]. 
42 Amy Langenfeld, Comment, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of 
Immigrants Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, 31 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041, 1048–49 (1999). 
43 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 § 2. 
44 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)–(d) (2006). 
45 Id. 
46 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act §§ 203, 
211–18, 307, 324, 333–334. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) included provisions creating four new criminal offenses 
in immigration law and increasing the penalties for a number of pre-existing 
criminal offenses. Id. §§ 108, 203, 211–18, 307, 324, 333–334. 
47 Id. § 108 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 758 (2006)). 
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relate to criminal activity.48  This expanding intersection between 
criminal law and immigration law is reflected in the increased 
number of aliens deported and the number of criminal aliens 
removed from the country annually.49 
2. Increased Penalties for Immigration Violations 
As the number of criminal immigration laws has increased 
so has the severity of penalties imposed for immigration 
violations.  Prior to 1924, when unlawful entry was first 
criminalized, immigration violations were only punished civilly.50  
With the criminalization of unlawful entry, a first offense became 
a misdemeanor, which carried a sentence of up to one year in 
prison.51  Subsequent unlawful re-entry was a felony offense 
punishable by up to two years in prison.52  Immigrants were also 
subjected to deportation if they committed a crime shortly after 
arriving in the United States.53  In the past few decades, the 
severity of criminal penalties imposed for immigration violations 
has increased drastically.54 
 
48 Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the 
New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 619 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship 
& Severity].  
49 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS 91  tbl.33 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf. “Criminal aliens” are those who have 
previously been convicted of a crime. Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, 
at 632. As the number of deportable crimes increases, the number of criminal aliens 
removed will increase as well. Id. 
50 Stumpf, supra note 31, at 384. 
51 Ngai, supra note 32, at 76. 
52 Id. 
53 Immigration Act of 1917, H.R. 10384, 64th Cong. § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 899 
(1917). 
54 The severity of civil penalties imposed for immigration violations has also 
increased as a result of recent immigration reform acts. The five-year limitation on 
deportability for crimes involving moral turpitude, instituted by the Immigration 
Reform Act of 1917, was removed—making an alien deportable for a crime involving 
moral turpitude committed at any point after his admission to the United States. 
Compare Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (1996), with H.R. 10384 
§ 19. While not directly criminalizing any behavior, this allows for the aliens who 
have committed a wide range of crimes to be punished criminally and subsequently 
deported. See Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 41, at 83–84. This act 
further increased the number of deportable aliens by allowing deportation as long as 
the requisite crime may have been punished by one year imprisonment, even if the 
actual sentence given was less. Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 633. 
Prior to this amendment, an alien must have actually received a sentence of a year 
or longer. See id. Congress has also allowed for the imposition of steep civil fines to 
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The push towards increased criminal penalties for 
immigration violations began in the 1980s with a general 
national shift towards increased criminal sanctions.55  The 1986 
IRCA expanded the use of criminal penalties in immigration law, 
subjecting employers of aliens without work authorization to 
fines and incarceration.56  Changes to the offense of unlawful 
entry at an “improper time or place,” also enacted at this time, 
made an initial violation a misdemeanor and allowed for felony 
sanctions for a subsequent “commission.”57  Amendments made to 
this statute in 1990 also criminalized attempted unlawful entry, 
which was previously not punishable under the statute.58  These 
amendments allowed an alien to be prosecuted as a felon even 
without a prior conviction for the offense.59 
Congress continued this trend of increasing criminal 
penalties with the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), provisions 
of which increased the penalties associated with roughly a dozen 
separate offenses.60  One such provision increased criminal 
penalties for alien smuggling and allowed for the application of 
penalties on a per alien basis instead of per transaction.61  
Congress also requested that the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
amend existing guidelines pertaining to alien smuggling offenses 
to increase the base level for the offense by “at least 3 offense 
 
be imposed, in addition to any criminal penalties, for illegal entry or failure to 
depart. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
§§ 105, 334. While not criminal themselves, the imposition of these civil penalties 
creates financial hardships, furthers immigration disabilities for the alien, and is 
often imposed in addition to any criminal penalties. See generally Barboza, supra 
note 12. 
55 Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 628–29. During the 1980s the 
nation was also shifting into gear with its war on drugs and implementing stiff 
criminal penalties, like three-strikes laws. Id. at 627 n.83, 629.  
56 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, § 101, 100 
Stat. 3359, 3360 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)); Miller, Citizenship & 
Severity, supra note 48, at 630. 
57 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).  
58 See United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir. 1993).  
59 See United States v. Arambula-Alvarado, 677 F.2d 51, 52 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(prosecution provided evidence of defendant’s prior conduct in violation of § 1325(a), 
which did not result in conviction; the Ninth Circuit did not impose felony sentence 
based on rule of lenity).  
60 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, §§ 203, 211–18, 307, 324, 333–334, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-566 to 67, 
3009-569 to 74, 3009-612 to 14, 3009-629, 3009-634 to 35 (1996). 
61 Id. § 203. 
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levels,” “increase the sentencing enhancement by at least 50 
percent,” and impose provisions for various sentence 
enhancement conditions.62 
The increased reliance on criminal penalties in the 
enforcement of immigration law has significantly blurred the line 
between criminal offenses and traditionally civil immigration 
offenses.  Immigration offenses that were once penalized by civil 
deportation or other civil penalties are now categorized as 
misdemeanor and felony offenses, which can earn the violator 
several years in prison.63  Criminal penalties for immigration 
related offenses have, for some offenses, doubled.64  These 
increasingly criminal penalties, coupled with increased 
enforcement, have resulted in the incarceration of an 
unprecedented number of aliens.65  
3. Evolving Immigration Enforcement Practices 
The changing role of immigration enforcement in the United 
States has also contributed significantly to the increased 
criminality in immigration law.  Enforcement of immigration 
laws was virtually non-existent until the creation of the United 
States Border Patrol in 1924.66  The creation of this “enforcement 
mechanism[] spurred a dramatic increase in the number of 
deportations,” but enforcement remained civil in nature and 
severely constrained by limited financial resources.67  Those 
awaiting deportation were frequently granted relief from 
detention, allowing them to remain with their families and in 
their community throughout the duration of the proceedings.68  
Judicial review of deportation proceedings was broad, and judges 
had the authority to grant relief to those facing deportation in 
the form of a discretionary waiver.69  The approach to 
enforcement continued to remain lax until encountering drastic 
reforms in the 1980s.70 
 
62 Id. § 203(e)(2). 
63 See Stumpf, supra note 31, at 371. 
64 See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
§ 203(e)(2). 
65 Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 641. 
66 See Ngai, supra note 32, at 76; Stumpf, supra note 31, at 384. 
67 Ngai, supra note 32, at 76. 
68 Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 622–23. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 623–24.  
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The immigration reforms that began to take effect in the 
1980s, and which increased the number and severity of 
immigration offenses, were accompanied by an increase in 
immigration enforcement.  To give effect to the employment 
restrictions it created, IRCA called for increased appropriations 
for enforcement activities and worksite inspections.71  This act 
also called for increases in inspection and enforcement activities 
by the Border Patrol, and called for a fifty percent increase in 
Border Patrol personnel.72  In 1996, Congress increased 
immigration enforcement efforts again with IIRIRA provisions 
that increased the number of Border Patrol agents by at least 
1,000 agents per year for the subsequent five years.73 
Recent legislation has done more than expand the ranks of 
immigration officers; it has expanded the authority of these 
officers as well.  Immigration officers have the general authority 
to make arrests for any “offense against the United States” 
occurring in their presence or for any felony under United States 
law.74  In performance of their duties, immigration officers 
function in a manner virtually indistinguishable from law 
enforcement officers.  They carry firearms, execute warrants,75 
conduct vehicle stops,76 and operate checkpoints.77  In some 
respects, these immigration officers have broader enforcement 
authority than law enforcement officers.  Immigration officers, 
unlike state law enforcement officers, have the statutory 
authority to board and search trains, aircraft, and vehicles for 
unauthorized aliens within “a reasonable distance” from the 
border without first obtaining a warrant.78  Immigration officers 
may even patrol private lands within twenty-five miles of the 
border for the purpose of preventing aliens from illegally entering 
 
71 Id. at 630. 
72 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 111(b)(2), 
100 Stat. 3359, 3381 (1986). 
73 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-553 (1996). 
74 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(5) (2006). Border Patrol agents have the general authority 
to make arrests for any “offense against the United States” occurring in their 
presence or for any felony under United States law. Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). 
77 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 574 (1976). 
78 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3). 
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the United States.79  Recently, the authority of immigration 
officers has been extended, granting them the authority to 
enforce federal drug laws and customs laws.80 
This increased manpower and enforcement authority of 
federal immigration officers has been supplemented by the 
increasing authority of state law enforcement officers to perform 
the functions of an immigration officer.81  The extent of state law 
enforcement officers’ authority to enforce federal laws has long 
been a point of contention.82  It has traditionally been held that 
the authority of state law enforcement officers was restricted to 
enforcing immigration laws that were criminal.83  Attorney 
General John Ashcroft issued an opinion in 2002 that 
contradicted this widely held belief, stating that states had the 
inherent authority to enforce both criminal and civil federal 
immigration laws.84  Moreover, the Attorney General may now 
enter into agreements with state agencies which allow properly 
trained state law enforcement officers to carry out immigration 
functions while acting under color of federal authority.85  
Certification by the Attorney General allows the state officer to 
 
79 Id. Border Patrol agents may also conduct warrantless searches of 
individuals, and their personal effects, who are deemed to be applicants for 
admission for evidence which may lead to their exclusion from the United States. Id. 
§ 1357(c).  
80 See Enforcement Initiatives Against Drug Smuggling in Southern California: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt. & Intergovernmental 
Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 2–3 (2001) (statement of 
William T. Veal, Chief Patrol Agent, San Diego Border Patrol Sector, INS), available 
at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/testtrg.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., BORDER PATROL DRUG INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES 
ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, REPORT NO. I-98-20 (September 1998), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/e9820/. Border Patrol Agents are cross-
designated to enforce these laws under 19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (2006) and 
21 U.S.C.A. § 878(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
81 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 
82 See LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32270, ENFORCING 
IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (2009). 
83 See id. at 4. Some states expressly authorize state law enforcement officers to 
enforce federal criminal laws while others see it as within their inherent powers. Id. 
84 Id. at 7 (quoting John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks on the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002)); see also Kris W. Kobach, 
The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police To Make 
Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 182 (2005) (stating that the inherent 
authority of state and local law enforcement to make arrests for criminal violations 
of the INA has “long been widely recognized” but that confusion exists relating to 
arrest authority under the INA’s civil provisions). 
85 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 
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perform “function[s] of an immigration officer in relation to the 
investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United 
States (including the transportation of such aliens across State 
lines to detention centers).”86 
Efforts to increase the efficacy of immigration enforcement 
snowballed in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.87  
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidated forty agencies, 
including the Border Patrol and several others dealing with 
immigration enforcement, under the umbrella of the Department 
of Homeland Security.88  New federal agencies have also joined in 
the enforcement of immigration laws.  Formed in 2003, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) joined the efforts 
of Border Patrol in enforcing, among other things, immigration 
laws.89   
Under new regulations established since September 11, 
2001, there has been a heightened application of both new and 
pre-existing immigration laws.  These regulations call for the 
fingerprinting of all illegal or criminal aliens apprehended 
nationwide.90  Furthermore, procedures were implemented to 
strengthen and enforce the application of the National Security 
Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”), which required all 
aliens remaining in the United States for more than thirty days 
to register and be fingerprinted.91  Procedures were put in place 
for the enforcement of NSEERS requirements, which were  
 
 
 
86 Id. § 1357(g)(1). 
87 See, e.g., SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 82; Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra 
note 48, at 644. 
88 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
89 Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ 
about/overview/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (“ICE’s primary mission is to promote 
homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of 
federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration.”). In 
carrying out its mission, ICE agents have been given the authority to enforce over 
400 federal statutes. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, EMBASSY OF THE 
UNITED STATES MANILA, PHILIPPINES, http://manila.usembassy.gov/us-
agencies2/u.s.-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.html (last visited Sept. 16, 
2012).  
90 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 112, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-559 (1996). 
91 John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Announcing the National Security 
Entrance and Exit Registration System (June 5, 2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/natlsecentryexittrackingsys.htm. 
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regularly waived by agency regulations prior to the September 11 
attacks, with regard to aliens deemed to be a high risk or a 
national security threat.92 
The increased authority of immigration enforcement officers 
and enhanced enforcement strategies being implemented in the 
recent attempt to curb the flow of illegal immigrants into the 
United States and secure the nation’s borders has resulted in the 
rapid evolution of immigration enforcement.  Immigration 
officers no longer enforce purely civil laws but a myriad of 
criminal laws as well.93  Their enforcement activities mirror those 
performed by law enforcement agencies and their authority often 
overlaps that of law enforcement agencies.94  The current 
enforcement practices of an immigration officer differ little from 
those of a state or local law enforcement officer who can enforce 
criminal drug laws and make a mental health arrest.95 
Immigration enforcement is no longer the distinct, 
predominantly civil, regulatory system that it traditionally was.  
Criminal statutes and stiff criminal sanctions have now 
comprehensively reshaped immigration law.  The overlapping 
enforcement authority of federal immigration officers and state 
law enforcement officers has eliminated any appreciable 
distinction between civil immigration laws and criminal 
immigration laws.96  This increasing criminalization of 
immigration law merits the extension of Fifth Amendment 
protections to immigration law, at least for criminal statutes like 
8 U S.C. § 1324. 
 
 
 
92 Id. 
93 See Stumpf, supra note 31, at 371. 
94 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006) (detailing the powers of federal immigration 
officers and employees). 
95 See id. § 1357(a)(5) (authorizing federal immigration officers to, in the course 
of their duties, make arrests for the violation of any laws of the United States). 
96 See id. 
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B. An Exception to the Fifth Amendment Protection Against 
Self-Incrimination 
1. The Regulatory Regime Exception Defined in Albertson v. 
Subversive Activities Control Board 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in 
relevant part, that no individual “shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”97  This protection 
has been found to apply “in any proceeding, civil or criminal, 
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, in which 
the witness reasonably believes that the information sought, or 
discoverable as a result of his testimony, could be used in a 
subsequent state or federal criminal proceeding.”98  However, this 
protection against providing potentially incriminating testimony 
is not without limitations.  The Fifth Amendment protection 
against self-incrimination does not justify making false 
statements or withholding required business records and 
documents and cannot be claimed on behalf of a corporation.99  In 
some situations, Congress may require potentially incriminating 
information to be reported to the government without violating 
the privilege against self-incrimination.100 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this Fifth 
Amendment privilege “may not be invoked to resist compliance 
with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s public 
purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.”101  
The constitutional safeguards provided by the Fifth Amendment 
may be limited with regard to statutory self-reporting 
regulations in areas of inquiry deemed to be regulatory.  In 
assessing the constitutionality of a self-reporting statute, courts 
look at: (1) if it was directed at a highly selective group 
 
97 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
98 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672 (1998) (quoting Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
compelled production of objects has been found to be sufficiently testimonial to 
trigger the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination where the 
demanded object “might be used as evidence in or at least supply investigatory leads 
to a criminal prosecution.” Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 
70, 78 (1965). 
99 See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).  
100 United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 616 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.  
101 Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990) 
(emphasis added). 
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inherently suspect of criminal activities, (2) if it was asserted in 
an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry, and 
(3) if compliance would create a substantial likelihood of 
prosecution.102 
Under this evaluation, self-reporting statutes found to 
violate the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-
incrimination were in areas of inquiry “permeated with criminal 
statutes”103 and where the divulgence would “prove a significant 
‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish . . . guilt.”104  For 
example, in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, the 
Supreme Court set aside an administrative order that required 
members of the Communist Party of the United States to register 
as such because this admission could be used to prosecute them 
under various laws.105  The Court found that the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was rightfully 
asserted because the statute was directed at only Communist 
Party members rather than the public at large and because the 
inquiries were in an inherently criminal area.106  
Similarly, in Marchetti v. United States, the Supreme Court 
set aside the petitioner’s conviction for failure to register and pay 
occupational taxes on his gambling business in violation of 
federal wagering tax statutes.107  In reaching this decision, the 
Court found that the statute targeted a group inherently suspect 
of criminal activity, gambling, and that “every portion of [the] 
requirements had the direct and unmistakable consequence of 
incriminating petitioner.”108  Furthermore, in Leary v. United 
States, the Court afforded protection against self-incrimination to 
a defendant convicted under a similar statute which required 
marijuana dealers to register and pay a transfer tax.109  The 
 
102 United States v. Adair, No. 88-1264, 1988 WL 114791, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 
1988).  
103 Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79. 
104 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16 (1969) (reversing conviction under 
Marijuana Tax Act); see also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 6061 (1968) 
(struck down statute criminalizing willful failure to pay occupational tax on 
wagering); Albertson, 382 U.S. at 81 (setting aside administrative order compelling 
individuals to admit membership in the Communist Party of the United States as 
admission could be used for prosecution under various statutes). 
105 Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79–80. 
106 Id. at 79. 
107 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 41. 
108 Id. at 49. 
109 Leary, 395 U.S. at 1415. 
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Court found that the statute “compelled [the] petitioner to expose 
himself to a ‘real and appreciable’ risk of self-incrimination”110 
and “would surely prove a significant ‘link in a chain’ of evidence 
tending to establish his guilt.”111 
Alternatively, self-reporting statutes that have been found 
not to violate individuals’ Fifth Amendment rights tend to be in 
areas that are mostly regulatory, where the statute itself is 
aimed at a broad range of individuals, and where compliance is 
not likely to result in prosecution.112  For example, in California 
v. Byers, a challenge was raised as to the constitutionality of a 
California “hit and run” statute that required any driver involved 
in an automobile accident to “stop at the scene and give his name 
and address.”113  The Supreme Court held that the mere 
possibility of incrimination created by this compelled disclosure 
did not conflict with the Fifth Amendment because most persons 
involved in accidents are not subject to criminal prosecution.114  
Furthermore, the Court found that the statute in question was 
aimed at the public as a whole and was part of the essentially 
regulatory California Vehicle Code.115   
2. The Albertson Test Has Been Inconsistently Applied 
While the three-factor assessment in Albertson v. Subversive 
Activities Control Boardexamining the size of the group, the 
regulatory nature of the law, and the likelihood of 
prosecutionappears to lay out a structured framework for 
courts to assess self-reporting statutes, in fact, courts have wide 
latitude in applying the test.  This has resulted in inconsistent 
interpretations.   
 
110 Id. at 16. 
111 Id. (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48). 
112 See United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 641 (2d Cir. 1979) (denying 
application of Fifth Amendment and affirming conviction for failure to report export 
of currency as required under Bank Security Act); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 
708, 728 (2d Cir. 1978) (denying application of Fifth Amendment and affirming 
conviction for defrauding company shareholders by inflating reported company 
earnings and withholding material information regarding sale of stocks); Garner v. 
United States, 501 F.2d 228, 234 (9th Cir. 1972) (denying application of Fifth 
Amendment and affirming conviction for failure to report source of income on federal 
income tax return). 
113 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 425 (1971). 
114 Id. at 431. 
115 Id. at 430. 
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In applying the Albertson factors, courts have little guidance 
in determining how broadly or narrowly to frame the target 
group affected by the law.  For example, in United States v. 
Flores, the Ninth Circuit assessed a statute requiring certain 
individuals shipping firearms to notify the air carrier of their 
presence and found that it was inconsistent with the Fifth 
Amendment protections against self-incrimination.116  In 
reaching this decision, the court noted that the statute in 
question was directed only at firearms dealers who were 
themselves unlicensed or shipping to unlicensed individuals.117  
That same statute was found to be constitutional by the Fourth 
Circuit, in United States v. Wilson.118  While acknowledging that 
there were more rigorous reporting requirements for persons 
delivering weapons illegally, the Fourth Circuit found that this 
statute was not directed at a highly selective group but at all 
passengers.119 
Similarly, when assessing whether the area of inquiry is 
non-criminal and regulatory, courts may choose to focus on either 
the specific statute or the general area of law.  In Byers, the 
Court focused primarily on the specific hit-and-run statute in 
question, noting that “[a]lthough the California Vehicle Code 
defines some criminal offenses, the statute [was] essentially 
regulatory, not criminal.”120  The Court took the opposite 
approach in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. 
Bouknight when called upon to assess the validity of a contempt 
order issued by a juvenile court when a mother, being 
investigated for the murder of her child, failed to produce the 
same child before the court as ordered.121  In determining that 
the order fell within the regulatory regime exception, the Court  
 
 
 
116 United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593, 59596 (9th Cir. 1983) (assessing the 
reporting requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e)), vacated, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985). 
117 Id. at 596 (quoting Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968)) 
(“Because any dealing in firearms by an unlicensed person is illegal, 
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), and because any shipment to an unlicensed person is also 
illegal, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2), the statute is directed at ‘a highly selective group 
inherently suspect of criminal activities.’ ”). 
118 United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 97374 (4th Cir. 1983). 
119 Id. (“[A]ll passengers on a common carrier are required by 
[18 U.S.C.] § 922(e) to give some form of notice if they possess firearms.”). 
120 Byers, 402 U.S. at 430. 
121 493 U.S. 549, 55253 (1990). 
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noted that the order was enforced as “part of a broadly directed, 
noncriminal regulatory regime governing children cared for 
pursuant to custodial orders.”122 
The final factor assessed by courts, whether compliance 
would create a substantial likelihood of prosecution, has also 
been applied with some degree of variation.  The Court in 
Marchetti placed great emphasis on this factor, noting that “[t]he 
central standard for the privilege’s application has been whether 
the claimant is confronted by substantial and ‘real,’ and not 
merely [t]rifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.”123  In 
holding that the federal wagering tax statute in question violated 
the protection against self-incrimination, the Court found that 
registrants could reasonably expect compliance to “significantly 
enhance the likelihood of their prosecution . . . [and] provide 
evidence which will facilitate their convictions.”124  While the 
Court in Marchetti found that a mere trifling risk of 
incrimination was not enough to invoke the protection, they 
noted that the rule must be flexible enough to ensure that the 
constitutional privilege was not easily evaded.125  However, the 
Court took a more restrictive view of this factor in both Byer and 
Bouknight, and denied the Fifth Amendment protection where 
the reporting requirement did not “focu[s] almost exclusively on 
conduct which was criminal.”126  Unlike Marchetti, these two 
cases suggest that only reporting requirements that demand 
“disclosure of inherently illegal activity” will be found to violate 
the constitutional privilege.127   
The inconsistent interpretation and application of these 
factors has left courts with little clarity on how to apply these 
factors when determining whether a statute falls within this 
“regulatory regime” exception to the Fifth Amendment.  Under 
the current formula, a court could determine that “every statute 
not naming the persons or organizations to whom it applies is 
directed at the public at large.”128  Similarly, “[v]irtually any civil 
 
122 Id. at 559. 
123 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (quoting Rogers v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951)). 
124 Id. at 54. 
125 Id. 
126 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 454 (1971)). 
127 Byers, 402 U.S. at 431. 
128 Id. at 470 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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regulatory scheme could be characterized as essentially 
noncriminal by looking narrowly . . . to the avowed noncriminal 
purpose of the regulations.”129  This inconsistency has left lower 
courts with little guidance on which approach they should take in 
any given case and has resulted in the inconsistent application of 
the Fifth Amendment.130  The increasing number of criminal 
statutes in regulatory areas of law, like immigration, has created 
an urgent need to remedy the unpredictability of the Albertson 
test and establish a more consistent rule which will protect the 
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. 
II. ALBERTSON HAS LED TO THE ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Recently, in the United States v. Garcia-Cordero,131 the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an immigration law 
requiring all those transporting undocumented aliens into the 
United States to immediately bring the aliens to U.S. 
immigration officials did not violate the Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination.132  The court found that the 
statute at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), did not violate the 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right because the law fell within 
the regulatory regime exception.133  In making this decision, the 
court applied the test laid out in Albertson by assessing whether 
the statute: (1) was directed at a group inherently suspect of 
criminal activities; (2) was asserted in an essentially non-
criminal and regulatory area of inquiry; and (3) would create a 
substantial likelihood of prosecution were one to comply with 
it.134  This Section will first discuss the “bring and present” 
requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) and its legislative 
history.  Second, it will discuss how the regulatory regime test 
was applied to this statute in Garcia-Cordero. 
 
129 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
130 Compare United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1983), 
vacated, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985), with United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 
973 (4th Cir. 1983). 
131 610 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547. 
132 Id. at 618–19. 
133 Id. 
134 See id. at 617. 
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A. The History and Application of the “Bring and Present” 
Requirement 
An analysis of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) at the statute 
level would necessarily lead the court to conclude that it violates 
the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment.  There are five 
separate smuggling offenses criminalized by § 1324(a).135  Section 
1324(a)(2) was added to the statute in 1986 in response to the 
Mariel Boatlift crisis of 1980, the mass exodus of some 125,000 
Cuban aliens to Florida—many of whom were criminals.136  This 
statute provides criminal sanctions for: 
Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact 
that an alien has not received prior official authorization to 
come to, enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or 
attempts to bring to the United States in any manner 
whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which 
may later be taken with respect to such alien . . . .137 
This offense is similar to the alien smuggling offense 
chargeable under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i),138 which was in 
effect prior to the Mariel Boatlift crisis.  However, this provision 
extends to smuggling attempts at designated ports of entry as 
well.139  Section 1324(a)(2) also has a slightly relaxed knowledge 
 
135 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006). 
136 Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 (1982); Miller, Citizenship & Severity, 
supra note 48, at 627–28. It is rumored that many of the Cubans who arrived as part 
of the Mariel Boatlift were inmates and mental patients sent at Castro’s behest. 
Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 628. 
137 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). 
138 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(i) provides criminal penalties for:  
(1)(A) Any person who-- 
(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring to the 
United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other than 
a designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the 
Commissioner, regardless of whether such alien has received prior official 
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States and 
regardless of any future official action which may be taken with respect to 
such alien . . . . 
To prove this offense, it must be established that the defendant had actual 
knowledge that the person brought to the U.S. was an alien. United States v. Aslam, 
936 F.2d 751, 754–55 (2d Cir. 1991). Some courts have taken a stricter 
interpretation of this statute and required the prosecutor to establish that the 
defendant had acted with the intent to commit a crime. See United States v. Nguyen, 
73 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 1995). 
139 The alien smuggling offense in existence at the time of the Mariel Boatlift 
was found not to apply to the individuals who transported the Cubans to the United 
States via boat as they lacked the intent to commit a crime and they did not bring 
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element, as the prosecutor may prove reckless disregard for the 
alien’s status instead of actual knowledge.140  Under § 1324(a)(2), 
the defendant need not have any surreptitious intent, only a 
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien did not receive prior 
approval to come to the United States.141 
Subsection B of § 1324(a)(2) provides for “sentence 
enhancements” in various circumstances,142 which are treated as 
additional elements of the offense to be proven.143  The third of 
these provisions, which was at issue in Garcia-Cordero, provides 
that in the case of: 
(iii) an offense in which the alien is not upon arrival 
immediately brought and presented to an appropriate 
immigration officer at a designated port of entry, 
[the defendant shall] be fined under Title 18 and shall be 
imprisoned, in the case of a first or second violation of 
subparagraph (B)(iii), not more than 10 years . . . .144 
The addition of this element creates an offense different in 
nature than the smuggling offense under § 1324(a)(2); it adds an 
intent to evade inspection.  This provision also includes a self-
reporting requirement.  In order to avoid charges, and up to ten 
years in prison, under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), the individual 
transporting unauthorized aliens must immediately bring and 
present them to an immigration officer for inspection.145 
In enacting this statute, Congress intended to extend the 
reach of the existing anti-alien smuggling statutes by 
criminalizing the mere act of bringing undocumented aliens to 
the United States; even if those aliens were brought to a 
 
the aliens to the country in a surreptitious manner intended to evade inspection. 
See, e.g., United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 300 (S.D. Fla. 1980). 
140 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). 
141 Id. § 1324(a)(2). 
142 Id. § 1324(a)(2)(B). 
143 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 258 (1999). The Supreme Court 
found, in analyzing a different statute, that “a fact is an element of an offense rather 
than a sentencing consideration, [when those] elements must be charged in the 
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Id. at 232. The Court held that where a sentence enhancement included facts 
that could be in dispute it would be a denial of due process to treat them as 
sentencing factors. Id. at 241–42. 
144 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
145 See id. 
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designated port of entry for inspection.146  This statute increased 
the range of criminal conduct chargeable as alien smuggling and 
eliminated the general criminal intent requirement that courts 
had read into the previously existing statute.147  The criminal 
nature of this statute is also evident in that Congress made 
violations of this statute a felony, punishable by up to ten years 
in prison.   
B. The Application of the Albertson Test to United States v. 
Garcia-Cordero  
Garcia-Cordero moved to dismiss the charges against him for 
failure to present the aliens to an immigration officer, under 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), claiming they violated his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.148  Garcia-
Cordero claimed that, “This presentment requirement imposes 
an affirmative duty on an accused smuggler to come forward 
(immediately) and provide the government with evidence that 
will be used against him to prove the smuggling charges.”149  This 
motion to dismiss was denied and Garcia-Cordero was 
subsequently tried and convicted on all counts.150  Following trial, 
Garcia-Cordero’s constitutional challenge was renewed and 
addressed by the district court. 
Analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) in light of the factors 
set forth in Albertson, the district court determined that the 
“bring and present” requirement did not offend the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination as it fell within 
the regulatory regime exception.  The court first noted that the 
“bring and present requirement is part of an extensive scheme of 
statutes and regulations through which the government exercises 
its control over the nation’s borders.”151  The court determined, 
after evaluating other immigration statutes, that 
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) imposed no additional requirements on 
 
146 See United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(Korman, J., concurring) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 20 (1986)), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.  
147 Id. at 618 (majority opinion). 
148 United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2009), 
aff’d, 610 F.3d 613. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1319. 
151 Id. at 1317. 
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individuals who were in violation of § 1324(a)(2).152  Because of 
this, the court viewed the reporting requirement as being a 
“routine procedure universally employed” rather than imposed on 
a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal 
activities.153  Further, the court determined that the statute in 
question was “more analogous to Sullivan, Byers, and Bouknight, 
where the disclosure requirements were part of civil regulatory 
regimes.”154  In drawing this conclusion, the court relied upon 
precedent that found immigration law to be generally regulatory 
and to serve a substantial non-prosecutorial government 
interest.155  Based on this analysis, the district court found that 
the “bring and present” requirement, although potentially 
incriminating, fell within the regulatory regime exception and 
did not offend the Fifth Amendment.156 
Garcia-Cordero appealed, and this determination was 
reviewed de novo by the Eleventh Circuit, which also concluded 
that the “bring and present” requirement fell within the 
regulatory regime exception.  In its brief analysis, the court 
found § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) to be “part of the federal regulatory 
scheme through which the government controls our national 
borders” that imposes a reporting requirement on everyone 
 
152 In reaching this determination, the court noted the requirements found in 
8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006), 8 U.S.C. § 1221 (2006), and 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a) (2009). Id. 
at 1317–18. Section 1321(a) makes it the duty of “every person, including the 
owners, masters, officers, and agents of vessels, aircraft, transportation lines, or 
international bridges” who brings aliens to the United States “to prevent the landing 
of such alien in the United States at a port of entry other than as designated.” 
Section 1221 requires commercial vessels transporting persons from outside the 
United States to a port therein to provide a manifest listing each passenger and 
crew member to immigration officers at that port. Finally, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a) (2009) 
provides that individuals applying for entry into the United States must do so in 
person at a designated port of entry. 
153 Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. 
154 Id. at 1318. 
155 Id. at 1318–19. The court, in reaching this decision, cited to the Second 
Circuit’s assertion in Rajah v. Mukasey that immigration law is generally regulatory 
and that immigration crimes are “almost of a different order from that which 
governs those areas where reporting requirements have been struck down.” Rajah v. 
Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 442 (2d Cir. 2008). The court in Garcia-Cordero went on to 
note that, as a result of the government’s non-prosecutorial national security 
interest, “Fifth Amendment rights are generally diminished in the context of border 
crossings.” Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (citing United States v. 
McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
156 See Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1319. 
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transporting aliens into the country.157  The Eleventh Circuit 
differentiated the “bring and present” requirement from the 
reporting requirements in Albertson, Marchetti, Haynes, and 
Leary, which were aimed at “highly selective groups.”158  
Comparing Garcia-Cordero’s case to those like Byers and 
Bouknight, the court noted that “the activity required to be 
disclosed was not inherently illegal” and that the fact that 
incrimination may result does not trigger the protection against 
self-incrimination.159 
As the concurring opinion of Judge Korman makes clear, the 
determination of the Eleventh Circuit that this statute is 
regulatory contrasts sharply with the purpose of the statute 
intended by Congress.160  Judge Korman points out that “the 
purpose of [§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii)] was not to enforce compliance 
with the presentment requirement . . . .  Instead, it was intended 
to deter the smuggling of aliens into the United States and to 
punish those who engaged in that activity.”161  The determination 
reached by the Eleventh Circuit in applying the Albertson test 
and the intended purpose of the “bring and present” requirement 
are irreconcilable. 
III. THE ALBERTSON TEST IS INADEQUATE FOR ANALYZING 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege “may not be invoked to resist 
compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the 
State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its 
 
157 United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 618 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. (citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000)). The challenged 
disclosure in Byers related to individuals involved in motor vehicle accidents; in 
Bouknight, it was a court order to a mother to produce her child, believed to be dead, 
before the court. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 425 (1971); Balt. City Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 551 (1990). 
160 Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 619 (Korman, J., concurring) (concurring in 
judgment without reaching the merits of the self-incrimination claim). Judge 
Korman, a United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York sitting 
by designation, lays out in detail the history behind the current statute, as amended 
in 1986, and the “concern that, [w]ithout the threat of criminal prosecution, there is 
no effective way to deter potential transporters from inundating U.S. ports of entry 
with undocumented aliens.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-
682, pt. 1, at 66 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
161 Id. at 620. 
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criminal laws,”162 the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that the 
“bring and present” requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) 
fell within this exception is inequitable.  This section argues that 
the problem with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding is two-fold.  
First, the Eleventh Circuit erred in its application of the current 
Albertson test.  Second, the Court applied an antiquated test to 
assess the constitutionality of the “bring and present” 
requirement.  This test, established by Albertson almost half a 
century ago, has proven to be outdated and too unstructured to 
provide adequate and consistent protection of individuals’ 
constitutional rights.  The “bring and present” requirement is 
unconstitutional, even under Albertson, as it targets individuals 
inherently suspect of criminal activity and requires disclosures 
which create a substantial likelihood of prosecution. 
A. The Application of the Albertson Test in Garcia-Cordero Was 
Flawed 
Under the rule currently applied by the courts, the “bring 
and present” requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 should not fall 
under the regulatory regime exception to the Fifth Amendment 
because the statute is aimed at a group inherently suspect of 
criminal activity and because compliance creates a substantial 
likelihood of prosecution. 
1. Section 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) Is Directed at a Group Inherently 
Suspect of Criminal Activity 
In looking at § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), the Eleventh Circuit 
determined that the statute “applies to all persons transporting 
aliens to the United States—irrespective of whether those aliens 
have received prior authorization, and irrespective of the 
transporters’ knowledge regarding such authorization.”163  The 
court came to this conclusion based on the fact that a separate 
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a), requires that “every person bringing 
an alien to, or providing a means for an alien to come to, the 
United States prevent the alien from entering the country at any 
port of entry not designated by the Attorney General or 
 
162 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 556. 
163 Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 618. This statement was adopted in whole from 
the opinion of the district court. See United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 
2d 1312, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 613. 
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immigration officers.”164  However, when compared to § 1321(a), 
and other immigration statutes, the text of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) 
appears to be directed at a much more specific group of 
individuals than the court, or the text in isolation, suggests.   
The language used in the two sections make the groups  
targeted by the statutes strikingly different in three ways: 
(1) only § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) contains a reporting requirement, 
(2) § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) applies to a narrower range of people,  
and (3) § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) applies specifically to individuals 
transporting undocumented aliens. 
First, the court erroneously suggests that § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) 
“does not impose any additional requirements” beyond those 
required under § 1321(a)(2).165  This is not the case.  Section 
1321(a)(2) establishes a duty to prevent an alien brought to the 
United States from landing at any place other than a designated 
port of entry.166  This statute, which is punishable by fine, makes 
those transporting aliens to the United States financially liable 
for their compliance with United States law.167  Section 
1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) goes a step further and requires that any alien 
brought to the United States must be immediately brought and 
presented to immigration officers at a designated port of entry for 
inspection.168  While one statute requires aliens to be brought to a 
designated port of entry, the other requires the transporter to 
personally deliver the alien to an immigration officer for 
inspection. 
Second, § 1321(a), in its entirety, makes it “the duty of every 
person, including the owners, masters, officers, and agents of 
vessels, aircraft, transportation lines, or international bridges or 
toll roads, other than [certain] transportation lines” bringing 
aliens to the United States to ensure that they do not enter 
anywhere other than a designated port of entry.169  Because 
statutes should generally be construed so as to avoid superfluous 
language,170 the explicit mention of these specific transportation 
 
164 Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 618. 
165 Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. 
166 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
169 Id. § 1321(a). Similar language is used in § 1323(a)(1) which proscribes 
bringing “any alien who does not have a valid passport and an unexpired visa” to the 
United States. Compare id., with 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(1). 
170 Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). 
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providers in one section must bear some meaning.  This 
intentional disregard for the various transportation providers in 
§ 1324(a)(2) suggests that Congress intended this statute to 
apply solely to private individuals.  As it is written, 
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) does not apply to the public at large but only 
to those involved in the transportation of aliens to the United 
States. 
Third, the language in § 1324(a)(2) further restricts the 
applicability of subsection (B)(iii) to individuals bringing “an 
alien [who] has not received prior official authorization” to come 
to the U.S.171  When compared to the unrestricted language used 
in § 1321(a), which refers only to “an alien,”172 the group of 
individuals targeted by the statute shrinks significantly, further 
distinguishing it from generally applicable statutes such as the 
hit-and-run law at issue in Byers. 
At first blush, the use of the phrase “any person” in 
§ 1324(a)(2) suggests that the statute is directed at the public at 
large.  However, when viewed in light of other immigration 
statutes, the actual target group is much narrower.  When read 
in its entirety, the plain meaning of § 1324(a)(B)(iii) limits its 
application only to individuals bringing unauthorized aliens to 
the United States.173  Considering that this specific behavior is 
criminalized by § 1324(a)(2),174 the reporting requirement 
established by § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) necessarily applies to a group 
inherently suspect of criminal activity. 
2. Compliance with § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) Creates a Substantial 
Likelihood of Prosecution 
In assessing whether § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) falls within the 
regulatory regime exception, the Eleventh Circuit made no 
assessment of whether compliance with the statute would create 
a substantial likelihood of prosecution.175  The court, instead, 
 
171 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). 
172 Id. § 1321(a). 
173 See § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). Section 1321(a) proscribes similar conduct for 
companies and transportation agents and provides for a monetary penalty of $3,000 
per violation. 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a). 
174 The act of bringing an alien who lacks “a valid passport and an unexpired 
visa” (which would mean the alien lacked official authorization to come to the U.S.) 
is also made unlawful, and punishable civilly by fine. 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(1). 
175 See generally United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547. Likewise, the district court failed to make any analysis 
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dismissed Garcia-Cordero’s claim that the statute in question is 
analogous to other statutes determined to be invalid by 
distinguishing those cases as not relating to regulatory 
regimes.176  Comparing the “bring and present” requirement to 
the hit-and-run statute in Byers, the court held that the privilege 
does not excuse compliance with a regulatory regime.  This 
reasoning is completely circular and inadequate.  Unlike the 
statute in Byers, the “bring and present” requirement of 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) targets an activity that is inherently 
illegal—alien smuggling.177  When the practical effects of 
compliance with the “bring and present” requirement are 
considered, it is apparent that compliance would, in the very 
least, “furnish a link in the chain of evidence that would be used 
to prosecute him for alien smuggling.”178  Reporting that you have 
brought undocumented aliens to the country by delivering them 
to an immigration officer would likely subject you to prosecution 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A), a misdemeanor offense.179 
When given the proper statutory construction, an individual 
would be subject to the reporting requirement in 
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) only when bringing an unauthorized alien to 
the United States.  In order to comply with this reporting 
requirement, that individual would need to “bring” the alien to a 
designated port of entry and “present” him to an immigration 
officer for inspection.180  This act would be all that is required to 
prosecute the individual for misdemeanor alien smuggling under 
§ 1324(a)(2)(A) and would furnish evidence required for felony 
prosecution under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(i) or (ii).181  The elements 
required for prosecution under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) also overlap 
those required under § 1324(a)(1)(A), which also pertains to alien 
 
of the practical implications of compliance with the “bring and present” requirement. 
See generally United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 
2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 613. 
176 Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 617. These statutes previously found to be 
invalid by the Supreme Court include the required registration of marijuana dealers, 
wagering activities, certain firearms, and Communist Party membership. See 
generally Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. United States, 390 
U.S. 39 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Albertson v. Subversive 
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965). 
177 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). 
178 Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 617. 
179 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A). 
180 See id. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
181 See id. § 1324(a)(2). 
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smuggling, as evidenced by the fact that these charges are 
frequently brought simultaneously.182  A scenario in which an 
individual could comply with the requirements of 
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) without exposing himself to criminal liability 
under another statute is hard to imagine.  As a result, the self-
reporting requirements in § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) create a 
substantial, and almost certain, likelihood of prosecution. 
When the reporting requirements of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) are 
adequately evaluated under the test currently in use, it is clear 
that it does not fall within the regulatory regime exception.  Even 
assuming that immigration law is generally regulatory in nature, 
the reporting requirement in question is directed at a selective 
group inherently suspect of criminal activity such that complying 
with the requirements would furnish virtually all evidence 
needed for prosecution for other offenses. 
B. The Test Established by Albertson Is No Longer Adequate 
The test established by Albertson, decided forty-five years 
ago, for the application of the regulatory regime exception to the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination is no 
longer adequate.  Decades of application have revealed two major 
flaws with the Albertson test.  First, the test fails to account for 
the criminalization of formerly regulatory areas of law.  Second, 
the test does not provide guidance on how to determine the 
statute’s target group.  Because the Albertson test is so 
fundamentally flawed, it should be replaced with a new, more 
functional test, which is discussed in Part IV of this Note.   
1. Albertson Fails To Account for the Criminalization of 
Regulatory Laws 
The Albertson test does not account for changes in the legal 
landscape since 1965, specifically the criminalization of 
traditionally civil areas of law like immigration.  Since the 1980s, 
crime control efforts and legal policy in the United States have 
taken a “tough on crime” approach that emphasizes criminal 
 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1313 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 613 (2010); United States v. Almeida, 379 F. App’x 919, 
921–22 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chirino-Alvarez, 615 F.3d 1344, 1345–46 
(11th Cir. 2010) (defendant charged under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), 1324(B)(ii)–
(iii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2). 
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penalties and enforcement.183  This approach is highlighted by 
the nation’s “war on drugs,” “war on poverty,” “war on 
immigration,” and the more recent “war on terror.”184  However, 
this criminalization has apparently gone unnoticed by courts.  
Courts, like the Eleventh Circuit, continue to treat these areas of 
law as regulatory in nature and rely on precedent in applying the 
“area of inquiry” factor of the Albertson test instead of 
undertaking an independent analysis.185 
The problem with this “area of inquiry” analysis has become 
clear from the holdings in several recent cases, but is most 
clearly illuminated by Garcia-Cordero.  Applying the Albertson 
factors to the “bring and present” requirement of 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), the Eleventh Circuit defined the 
relevant area of inquiry as the entire “federal regulatory scheme 
through which the government controls our national borders.”186  
This is consistent with the findings of previous courts that self-
reporting requirements in immigration statutes fell within the 
regulatory regime exception.  These statutes, previously 
examined, dealt with alien registration under the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”)187 or the 
questioning of aliens by immigration officers to determine 
 
183 Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 627. 
184 See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 437 n.19 (2010) (discussing various domestic “wars” 
engaged in by the United States in recent years). 
185 For other arguments about the growth of criminal law into regulation, see 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
507 (2001). 
186 United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 618 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547. 
187 Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 432–33 (2d Cir. 2008). The NSEERS 
program was initiated in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to 
address deficiencies in the immigration system and was designed to allow the 
government to track international visitors to the United States. John Ashcroft, Att’y 
Gen., Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 
(June 6, 2002) [hereinafter Remarks on NSEERS], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm. 
The NSEERS program consisted of three components: (1) fingerprinting and 
photographing at the border, (2) periodic registration of aliens from high risk 
nations, and (3) exit controls informing the government of which visitors do not leave 
on time. Id. Part of this program, challenged in Rajah, required “alien males from 
certain designated countries who were over the age of 16 and who had not qualified 
for permanent residence to appear for registration and fingerprinting and to present 
immigration related documents.” Rajah, 544 F.3d at 433. 
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admissibility to the United States.188  In deciding Garcia-Cordero, 
the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s conclusion 
from its evaluation of NSEERS in Rajah v. Mukasey that 
immigration is generally regulatory and not criminal.189  Neither 
court provides any independent analysis or reasoning to support 
its conclusion regarding the nature of immigration law.  At first 
blush, Rajah appears to provide some guidance for evaluating the 
Fifth Amendment implications of the “bring and present” 
requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii); however, the statutes 
are dissimilar.  The self-reporting requirement in NSEERS was a 
condition for “the continued receipt of an immigration benefit,” 
which served substantial, non-prosecutorial, government 
interests.190  In contrast, the “bring and present” requirement is a 
criminal offense, unrelated to the maintenance of an immigration 
benefit and applicable to aliens and citizens alike, enacted to 
facilitate prosecutions for alien smuggling.191  The Eleventh 
Circuit’s reliance on the reasoning in Rajah is further misplaced 
as the court in Rajah was assessing a reporting requirement with 
strictly civil penalties—deportation.192  While the conclusion that 
a statute that is punishable by deportation is “of a different 
order”193 than a criminal statute is logical, it is laughable to make 
the same statement with regard to § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), which is 
punishable by up to ten years in prison.   
 
 
188 United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 899 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Because of the 
overriding power and responsibility of the sovereign to police national borders, the 
[F]ifth [A]mendment guarantee against self-incrimination is not offended by routine 
questioning of those seeking entry to the United States.”). 
189 Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.2d at 618 (citing Rajah, 544 F.3d at 442). The 
Eleventh Circuit again borrowed from the court in Rajah, quoting in its opinion that 
while there are “some crimes related to immigration violations . . . the level of 
criminal regulation in immigration matters is far less, and almost of a different 
order from that which governs those areas where reporting requirements have been 
struck down.” Id. (quoting Rajah, 544 F.3d at 442). 
190 Rajah, 544 F.3d at 442. The court went on to note that the Fifth Amendment 
also did not apply because aliens were not compelled to comply with this reporting 
requirement: “Any alien who did not wish to register could avoid doing so because 
the notices requiring registration applied only to those who remained in the United 
States after a certain date.” Id. at 443. 
191 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006); Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 620 
(Korman, J., concurring). 
192 Rajah, 544 F.3d at 442. 
193 Id. 
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Garcia-Cordero is not the first case in which this “area of 
inquiry” analysis has led to questionable constitutional 
determinations under Albertson.  In Byers, the Supreme Court 
addressed the constitutionality of California’s hit-and-run 
statute,194 finding that the statute did not violate the protection 
against self incrimination as California’s interest in enforcing its 
vehicle code was essentially regulatory.195  This conclusion was 
contrary to the holding of the California State Supreme Court 
who, in evaluating the same case, found that the defendant had 
rightly invoked his Fifth Amendment protections in light of the 
“widespread prevalence of criminal sanctions” regulating driver 
conduct.196  The judgment of the United States Supreme Court 
fails to acknowledge the “hundreds of state criminal statutes 
regulating authomobiles [sic]” in its conclusion, focusing only on 
the regulatory, non-prosecutorial interests of the state.197 
Similarly, the Court in Bouknight found that the protection 
against self-incrimination did not apply where a juvenile court 
imprisoned a mother, being investigated for homicide, on civil 
contempt charges for failure to produce her child before the court.  
In assessing the area of inquiry, the Court emphasized that the 
order to produce the child was made in the interest of the child as 
part of a broad regulatory scheme.198  As noted by the dissent in 
Bouknight, “[v]irtually any civil regulatory scheme could be 
characterized as essentially noncriminal by looking narrowly or, 
as in this case, solely to the avowed noncriminal purpose of the 
regulations.”199  The Court, instead of looking at the order in 
question, looked only to the purpose of the underlying civil 
regime. 
As seen in cases such as Garcia-Cordero, Byers, and 
Bouknight, the “area of inquiry” factor used under the Albertson 
test severely restricts the Fifth Amendment protection against 
 
194 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 425 (1971). The judgment in this case was 
issued by a split court; Justice Harlan joined in the judgment and wrote a concurring 
opinion with Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissenting. Id. at 434, 
459. 
195 Id. at 430. 
196 Id. at 438 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah 
Judicial Dist. of Mendocino Cnty., 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1046 (1969), vacated, Byers, 402 
U.S. 424. 
197 Byers, 402 U.S. at 460 (Black, J., dissenting).  
198 Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 561 (1990). 
199 Id. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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self-incrimination.  Courts, in looking at the area of inquiry, may 
determine that individuals must comply with virtually any self-
reporting requirement that falls within a generally regulatory 
scheme no matter how great the risk of self-incrimination. 
2. Albertson Does Not Guide Courts in Evaluating a Statute’s 
Target Group 
The Albertson test is flawed in that it does not appropriately 
structure a court’s analysis of the group targeted by a reporting 
requirement.  Albertson held that a reporting requirement that 
was aimed at a “highly selective group inherently suspect of 
criminal activit[y]” was unconstitutional.200  In applying this 
factor, courts have no guidance regarding the level at which they 
should frame their analysis; some courts look to the target of the 
specific reporting requirement while others look to the group 
targeted by the general area of law.  This has lead different 
courts to reach different conclusions regarding the same statute, 
resulting in the unequal availability of the constitutional 
protection against self-incrimination.201  Depending on the level 
at which courts evaluate this target group, any reporting statute 
can be deemed valid. 
The result of this flaw in assessing a reporting requirement’s 
target group is most clearly seen in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Bouknight.202  In Bouknight, the Court determined that the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination did not 
shield Bouknight from complying with a court order compelling 
the production of her child, as the juvenile protection scheme 
governed all persons caring for children under custodial order.203  
Based on this broad view of the target group—that affected by 
the entire civil regime—the Court determined that it did not 
target an inherently suspect group.204  The group targeted by the 
juvenile protection scheme in question is more specific and 
 
200 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965). 
201 Compare United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1983), reh’g 
granted, 732 F.2d 1438, (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) unconstitutional because directed only at shippers 
engaged in criminal conduct), with United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 973–74 
(4th Cir. 1983) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) to be a valid reporting requirement 
because it applied to all passengers). 
202 493 U.S. at 561. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 559. 
WF_Kelley (Do Not Delete) 12/3/2012  12:44 PM 
2012] RESTORING THE BALANCE  345 
inherently suspect of criminal activity than the Court suggests.  
As Justice Marshall notes in his dissent, the juvenile protection 
scheme is “closely intertwined with the criminal regime 
prohibiting child abuse and applies only to parents whose abuse 
or neglect is serious enough to warrant state intervention.”205  
However, what was being challenged in Bouknight was not the 
whole juvenile protection scheme; it was compliance with a 
specific court order—aimed only at Bouknight—demanding the 
production of a specific child who the government suspected was 
already dead.206 
The cases decided under the regulatory regime test in the 
forty-five years since Albertson have exposed two major flaws in 
its application.  First, it fails to account for the criminalization of 
regulatory areas of law and, second, it does not provide guidance 
on how to determine the statute’s target group.  A test which is 
so unstructured in its application that it leads to such 
inconsistent and illogical results is an ineffective means of 
protecting constitutional rights. 
IV. COURTS NEED TO FUNDAMENTALLY ALTER THE  
ALBERTSON TEST 
The Albertson test has proven to be an inadequate means of 
protecting individuals from compelled self-incrimination as it 
fails to provide enough structure to be applied consistently.  
Therefore, it must be refined to account for the criminalization of 
regulatory areas of law.  A new test must be adopted under 
which courts are required to evaluate the nature of the reporting 
requirement and the population directly affected by the 
requirement.  These factors would provide courts with a more 
focused, structured basis for analyzing self-reporting 
requirements and protecting individuals’ Fifth Amendment right 
to be free from compelled self-incrimination. 
 
 
205 Id. at 571 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
206 Id. at 553–54 (majority opinion). The Court notes in its opinion that 
Baltimore City Department of Social Services had already referred the case to police 
homicide investigators and that the juvenile court judge had expressed concern that 
the child, Maurice, was dead. Id. at 553. 
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A. The Nature of the Reporting Requirement 
Courts must assess whether the particular statute being 
challenged, rather than the entire area of law, is non-criminal 
and regulatory in nature.  In assessing the nature of the statute, 
courts should look to the legislative intent and the function 
actually served by the statute as it is applied.  This statute-level 
analysis will allow courts to distinguish reporting requirements 
in criminal statutes within regulatory regimes from those that 
are truly regulatory. 
Examining reporting requirements at the statute level would 
preserve decisions previously reached by courts in truly 
regulatory areas while protecting constitutional rights in areas 
where the line between civil and criminal has become blurred.  
For instance, the determination made by the Second Circuit in 
Rajah would not be affected by analyzing the nature of the 
statute.  The registration of aliens under the NSEERS program 
was required as a means of increasing the accountability of 
aliens and allowing the government to identify and deport those 
who overstayed their visas.207  The consequence imposed upon 
the defendants—the consequence explicitly intended by 
Congress—was the civil deportation of those who abused the 
immigration privileges they had been granted.208 
A test which focuses on the statute in question would allow 
courts to make better determinations regarding statutes in 
regulatory areas which are becoming increasingly criminalized.  
Had the Court in Bouknight focused on the court order in 
question, rather than the “broadly directed, noncriminal 
regulatory regime”209 of the state child protection regulations, 
they would have had to reconcile the “overlapping purposes 
underlying that statute and Maryland’s criminal child abuse 
statutes.”210  If the Court had evaluated the application of this 
civil statute, which serves the same purpose as a related criminal 
statute, under the recommended test, it probably would have 
found that the application of Fifth Amendment protections was 
necessary. 
 
207 See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 2008); Remarks on 
NSEERS, supra note 186. 
208 See Rajah, 544 F.3d at 448. 
209 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 559. 
210 Id. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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B.  The Population Affected by the Reporting Requirement 
Courts must evaluate the population affected by the 
reporting requirement by looking at the text of the statute, 
agency interpretations, and actual application.  By looking not 
only at the general text of the requirement, but beyond—to 
applicable agency interpretations or the application of the 
reporting requirement, courts can adequately and consistently 
assess the requirement’s target. 
This structured approach to analyzing the target population 
would provide more consistent outcomes.  The benefits of this 
approach could be seen by applying it to 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), the 
statute in question in both Flores211 and Wilson.212  This statute 
makes it a crime for any person to ship firearms via a common 
carrier, such as an airplane, to unlicensed individuals without 
notifying the carrier.213  Looking at this requirement and others 
in the same section—specifically § 922(f)—the Fourth Circuit 
determined that the reporting requirement applied to all 
passengers on the common carrier.214  In support of its 
interpretation, the Fourth Circuit noted that passengers who 
legally possessed weapons could turn them over to the carrier for 
the duration of the flight.215  However, common carriers also have 
a statutory duty not to ship weapons that would violate gun 
control law and would “likely act to protect itself by notifying 
authorities” of any illegal weapons they were notified of.216  While 
this statute would likely still be found valid after evaluating the 
 
211 United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1983), reh’g granted, 
732 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the 
Ninth Circuit eventually reversed its decision in this case, it did not provide any 
detailed explanation or analysis of why it changed its view of the target group. 
United States v. Flores, 753 F.2d 1499, 1500 (9th Cir. 1985). While this flip-flop 
brought the Ninth Circuit in line with the rest of the courts that analyzed this 
statute, its lack of explanation provides little guidance for later decisions. Id. at 
1501–02. 
212 United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
18 U.S.C. § 922(e) was not unconstitutional as it applied to all airline passengers, 
not a group inherently suspect of criminal activity). 
213 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (2006). 
214 Wilson, 721 F.2d at 973–74. The court further noted that the statute did not 
require individuals to report information to the government, but to a third party. Id. 
at 974. This statement appears, as noted by Flores, to merge the relevant Fifth 
Amendment analysis with the analysis of a Fourth Amendment issue which should 
remain separate. Flores, 729 F.2d at 598. 
215 Wilson, 721 F.2d at 973 n.7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(e)).  
216 Flores, 729 F.2d at 596. 
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factors and balancing the governmental and constitutional 
interests, it is important for courts to reach that conclusion based 
on analysis and not conjecture. 
Providing courts with a more structured framework for 
analyzing the reporting requirement’s target group will also help 
prevent hard cases from making bad constitutional law.  With no 
guidance to follow in their analysis, courts may inadvertently 
mold their analysis to the desired outcome in difficult cases, like 
Bouknight.  Bouknight was incarcerated on contempt charges for 
non-compliance with a court order to produce her son, whom the 
government suspected she had killed.217  The Supreme Court 
found that she was not entitled to the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment because the Baltimore juvenile protection scheme 
did not apply to a group inherently suspect of criminal activity.218  
Requiring the Court to evaluate the target of the court order, or 
even similar orders, would force it to reconcile this conclusion 
with the fact that the juvenile court supervises parents suspected 
of the abuse and neglect of their children.219 
Under these refined factors the “bring and present” 
requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) belongs within the 
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination.  The 
“bring and present” requirement creates an affirmative duty for 
individuals bringing undocumented aliens into the country to 
present these aliens to an immigration officer for inspection.220  
The statute was enacted for the purpose of criminalizing the act 
of bringing undocumented aliens to the country with this 
reporting requirement intentionally targeting alien smugglers.221  
Compliance with this reporting requirement would equate to 
admitting all necessary elements of a misdemeanor offense  
and providing evidence which could be used to prosecute or 
investigate other offenses.222  An analysis of the statute’s  
text suggests that it targets only individuals transporting 
undocumented aliens, which is a crime. 
 
 
217 Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 553 (1990). 
218 Id. at 559. 
219 Id. at 571 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
220 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006). 
221 United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman, 
J., concurring), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547. 
222 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)–(4). 
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Evaluating reporting requirements using the factors 
currently evaluated under Albertson has led courts to illogical 
and inconsistent determinations regarding the protection against 
self-incrimination.  Requiring courts to conduct a more 
structured analysis focused at the statutory level would allow 
them to adequately distinguish reporting requirements in 
regulatory areas of law that serve criminal purposes from those 
that are truly regulatory, allowing courts to maintain the 
tenuous balance between governmental needs and individual 
protections. 
CONCLUSION 
Self-reporting schemes are a necessary aspect of many areas 
of government regulation and allow the government to gather 
pertinent information.  However, these reporting requirements 
risk compelling individuals to provide the government with 
incriminating information.  In balancing these needs, the courts 
created a regulatory regime exception to the Fifth Amendment—
prohibiting individuals from using the Fifth Amendment to 
shield them from regulatory reporting requirements.  To 
determine whether a reporting requirement fell within this 
exception, the Supreme Court, in Albertson v. Subversive 
Activities Control Board, developed a test that evaluates whether 
the requirement was aimed at a selective group inherently 
suspect of criminal activities, asserted in an essentially non-
criminal and regulatory area of inquiry, and if compliance 
created a substantial likelihood of prosecution.  This test no 
longer adequately protects individuals from compelled self-
incrimination.  The Albertson test’s focus on the area of inquiry 
fails to account for the recent criminalization of traditionally 
regulatory areas of law, such as immigration law.  Furthermore, 
the test does not provide courts with guidance on how to evaluate 
the population targeted by the reporting requirement.  As a 
result, the court in United States v. Garcia-Cordero mistakenly 
found that the statute in question, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), 
fell within the regulatory regime exception. 
To continue to maintain the balance between the 
government’s need for efficient information gathering and 
individuals’ protection from self-incrimination, the Court must 
adopt a new standard for evaluating reporting requirements.  
First, courts must assess the nature of the reporting requirement 
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rather than the entire area of law.  Looking to the purpose of a 
statute and the function it serves will allow courts to adequately 
separate criminal statutes from those that are truly regulatory in 
nature.  Second, courts must focus on the population affected by 
the specific reporting requirement.  Courts must look deeper 
than the text on the face of the statute to the agency regulations 
and the real world application of the requirement as well.  Courts 
must diligently maintain the balance between governmental 
need for information and the constitutional right to be free from 
self-incrimination. 
 
